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NOTES
Florida v. Bostick': "Swapping-off Point for Fourth
Amendment Protections?"
IT]he right to be let alone [is] the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized men.2
I. INTRODUCTION
In no other time in our nation's history has the United States faced
such an endless battle as it has with the problem of drug trafficking
and abuse. The criminal conduct often coupled with substance abuse
has led to such a nationwide effort that this country has essentially
declared a "war on drugs." Soldiers in this war include the media,
educational institutions, drug enforcement agencies, the legislative and
executive branches of government and the United States Supreme Court.
To increase the effectiveness of law enforcement efforts in this
"war, ' 3 the Supreme Court, in its most recent decisions, has broadened
the freedom of law enforcement agents to intrude into people's lives,
effectively reducing our society's expectation of privacy. 4 These decisions
diminish the Fourth Amendment's probable cause' standard required to
justify the government's detention of its citizens. This is extremely
significant to all people since it is the Fourth Amendment which safe-
guards the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary govern-
ment invasions.6
Copyright 1992, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991).
2. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478, 48 S. Ct. 564, 572 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
3. This is illustrated by one of Justice Burger's dissenting opinions where he states:
"IT]he Court's holding operates as but a further hindrance on the already difficult effort
to police the narcotics traffic which takes such a terrible toll on human beings." Ybarra
v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 97, 100 S. Ct. 338, 345 (1979) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
4. Benner, Diminishing Expectations of Privacy in the Rehnquist Court, 22 J.
Marshall L. Rev. 825, 826 (1989).
5. See infra note 23.
6. U.S. Const. amend. IV. The amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or af-
firmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
One such case where the United States Supreme Court decided to
expand the freedom of law enforcement at the expense of individual
Fourth Amendment protections is Florida v. Bostick.7 There, the Court
reversed a state supreme court's attempt to adhere to historical Fourth
Amendment standards apparently in order to give way to the govern-
ment's greater interest in fighting the nation's drug problem.' This article
will first briefly present the Supreme Court decision, then review a line
of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence dealing with similar issues. Next,
the article will address the Florida court's decision followed by an
analysis of why the Supreme Court reversed the state decision. Finally,
the article will explore some potential repurcussions from these decisions.
II. FLoRIDA v. BosTicK
In Miami, Florida, Terrence Bostick boarded a bus which was en
route to Atlanta, Georgia.9 He positioned himself in the rearmost seat
and sat on his luggage bag.' 0 During a scheduled stopover in Fort
Lauderdale, Florida, two Broward County sheriff's officers boarded the
bus. Each officer wore badges and insignia; one of them held a rec-
ognizable zipper pouch containing a pistol. Eyeing the passengers, the
officers, admittedly without articulable suspicion, picked out Bostick and
requested his bus ticket and identification." Meanwhile one of the of-
ficers positioned himself so that he partially blocked the aisle.' Since
the ticket matched the identification, both were returned to Bostick as
unremarkable. The officers then explained their presence as narcotics
agents on the look-out for drugs. Accordingly, they requested Bostick's
consent to search his luggage. 3 The subsequent search resulted in the
discovery of cocaine and the arrest of the defendant. Bostick moved to
suppress the evidence from admissibility at trial on the grounds that it
was seized without probable cause thereby violating his Fourth Amend-
ment rights. The trial court denied the motion but made no factual
7. III S. Ct. 2382 (1991).
8. Id. at 2389.
9. Id. at 2384.
10. Bostick v. State, 554 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 1989).
1I. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2384-85.
12. Bostick, 554 So. 2d at 1157.
13. The Florida appellate court unsurprisingly found a conflict in the evidence re-
garding whether Bostick consented to the search of the second bag in which the contraband
was found and as to whether he was informed of his right to refuse consent. The conflict
was resolved in favor of the state as being a question of fact decided by the trial judge.
554 So. 2d at 1154-55, quoting 510 So. 2d at 321, 322 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987)
(Letts, J., dissenting in part).
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findings. 14 Bostick subsequently entered a plea of guilty, but reserved
the right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress."
The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's
denial, but considered the issue sufficiently important that it certified
a question to the Florida Supreme Court.' 6
After rephrasing the question presented" by the appellate court, the
Florida Supreme Court held "an impermissible seizure result[s] when[ever
the police mount a drug search on* buses during scheduled stops and
question boarded passengers without articulable reasons for doing so,
thereby obtaining consent to search the passengers' luggage."' 8 Conse-
quently, the court found that Bostick's subsequent consent 9 to the search
of his luggage did not overcome the taint of the illegal police conduct. 20
In other words, the Florida Supreme Court believed the officers' actions
to be tantamount to seizing Bostick without probable cause, long re-
garded as unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. Regardless of
whether Bostick consented to the search, the consent could not legitimize
the unlawful police action; therefore, items seized during the search were
to be suppressed. This ruling appeared to be consistent with those handed
down by the United States Supreme Court over the past two decades;
however, the State's petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court was granted. 2'
Before exploring the Supreme Court's decision it is helpful to ex-
amine a few of the significant cases which developed the judicial stan-
dards for determining whether an individual has been seized within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. This determination is highly relevant
since evidence obtained from a seizure made without probable cause is
inadmissible irrespective of any consent obtained thereafter, and because
14. Bostick, Ill S.Ct at 2385.
15. Id.
16. Bostick v. State, 510 So. 2d 321. 321-322 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987). The
majority of the district court below issued a per curiam affirmance, but agreed to certify
the question.
17. The district court certified the question as follows:
May the police without articulable suspicion board a bus and ask at random,
for, and receive consent to search a passenger's luggage where they advise the
passenger that he has the right to refuse consent to search?
Id. at 322. The supreme court rephrased the question as follows:
Does an impermissible seizure result when police mount a drug search on buses
during scheduled stops and question boarded passengers without articulable
reasons for doing so, thereby obtaining consent to search the passenger's luggage?
Bostick, 554 So. 2d at 1154.
18. Bostick, 554 So. 2d at 1154.
19. See supra note 13.
20. Bostick v. State, 554 So. 2d 1153, 1158 (Fla. 1989).
21. Florida v. Bostick, Ill S. Ct 241 (1990).
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the Florida Supreme Court relied on these cases in finding that Bostick's
Fourth Amendment rights had been violated.
III. HISToiucAL BACKGROUND
A. Probable Cause Requirement
The Fourth Amendment mandates the existence of probable cause
prior to any search by government agents of a particular person or
place.2 Probable cause23 is present where the facts and circumstances
are trustworthy and warrant a person of reasonable caution to conclude
that evidence associated with the crime may be located in a particular
place.2 Although the Fourth Amendment does not literally compel such
a conclusion, the prohibition against "unreasonable" searches and sei-
zures in its preceding clause has been construed to require those searches
and seizures permissibly conducted without a warrant to be subject to
the probable cause standard. 5
The line of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence relating to search and
seizure is long and distinguished. The following cases outline the United
States Supreme Court's historical application of the Fourth Amendment
protections to issues of search and seizure.
B. Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence
1. Terry v. Ohio
In 1968, the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio 6 addressed the ap-
plication of the Fourth Amendment to brief police detentions of indi-
22. See supra note 6.
23. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 100 S. Ct. 338, 342 (1979). The Court stated:
"Where the standard is probable cause, the search or seizure of a person must be supported
by probable cause particularized with respect to that person."
24. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161, 45 S. Ct. 280, 288 (1925). The Court
defining probable cause stated: "If the facts and circumstances before the officers are
such as to warrant a man of prudence and caution in believing that the offense has been
committed, [probable cause] is sufficient."
25. Wayne R. Lafave, Fourth Amendment Vagaries (Of Improbable Cause, Imper-
ceptible Plain View, Notorious Privacy, and Balancing Askew), 74 J. Crim. L. & Crim-
inology 1171, 1186 (1983). Professor Lafave explains quoting from Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 479-80, 83 S. Ct. 407, 413 (1963):
[Tlhe requirements of reliability and particularity of the information on which
an officer may act . . . surely cannot be less stringent [when an arrest is made
without a warrant] than where an arrest warrant is obtained. Otherwise, a
principal incentive now existing for the procurement of arrest warrants would
be destroyed.
26. 392 U.S. i, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968).
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viduals. In Terry an officer observed three men "casing" a store for
a robbery. 27 The officer grabbed, spun around, and frisked one of the
suspects; he discovered a pistol.2s Upon frisking the other two suspects,
the officer discovered another gun.29 The state ultimately convicted two
of the individuals for possession of a concealed weapon. 30 They appealed,
challenging the use of the weapons as incriminating evidence."
The Supreme Court held that the search of the suspects was rea-
sonable despite the absence of probable cause since the officer had
reasonable grounds to believe that the suspects were armed and dan-
gerous.32 Crucial to this holding was the officer's ability to point to
specific articulable facts which reasonably warranted the intrusion on
the individials. 31 Thus, Terry stands for the proposition that police are
authorized to briefly detain and search a person with less than probable
cause if the officers reasonably believe that public safety as well as their
own personal safety are in danger. 4 Additionally, it is important to
note Terry recognized that a "seizure," for Fourth Amendment purposes,
occurs whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his
freedom to walk away.31 Conceding that not every personal encounter
between law enforement officials and citizens involves a "seizure," the
Court focused on whether there was such a display of force or show
of authority as to restrain the person's liberty. Only then would a
conclusion that a "seizure" had occurred be warranted.36 Ten years
later, the Supreme Court used this analysis to create a test to determine
whether a "seizure" occurs within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment.
2. United States v. Mendenhall
In United States v. Mendenhall, 7 two justices of the Court employed
a narrower definition of seizure than that spelled out in Terry. 8 Ini
Mendenhall, DEA agents stopped a young woman upon her arrival at
27. Id. at 5-6, 88 S. Ct. at 1871-72.
28. Id. at 7, 88 S. Ct at 1872.
29. Id., 88 S. Ct. at 1872.
30. Id. at 4-5, 88 S. Ct. at 1871.
31. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 5, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1871 (1968) (appellants' challenge
was predicated on the absence of probable cause for the officer to detain the suspects).
32. Id. at 30-31, 88 S. Ct. at 1884-85.
33. Id. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880.
34. The court did not address the constitutional propriety of a seizure "upon less
than probable cause for purposes of 'detention' and/or interrogation." Id. at 19, 88 S.
Ct. at 1879 n.16.
35. Id. at 16, 88 S. Ct. at 1877.
36. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1877 (1968).
37. 446 U.S. 544, 100 S. Ct. 1870 (1980).
38. Id. at 553-54, 100 S. Ct. at 1877.
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the Detroit Metropolitan Airport on a commercial airline flight from
Los Angeles because she fit the pattern of a drug courier profile. 9 After
examining and returning Mendenhall's airline ticket and identification,
an agent asked her to accompany him to the airport DEA office for
further questions.40 Although Mendenhall did not verbally respond to
the agent's request, she did follow him to the office. 4' There, she
consented to a search resulting in an arrest and conviction for possession
of heroin.4 On these facts, the Supreme Court held that no seizure had
taken place during the initial confrontation with the DEA agents. 41 In
their view, "a person has been 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding
the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not
free to leave."" Justice Stewart emphasized that the airport was a public
place; the agents were in plain clothes and displayed no weapons; a
"request" versus a "demand" was made to examine her airline ticket
and identification; and, the agents did not summon Mendenhall to their
presence but approached her. Accordingly, the Court reasoned that
Mendenhall had no objective reason to believe she was not free to
terminate the questioning and proceed on her way. 4 As a result, the
Fourth Amendment protections requiring probable cause had not been
triggered because there was found to be no seizure; thus, her subsequent
consent to the search was valid, and the evidence obtained from that
search was therefore admissible. Curiously, in deciding this case in favor
of the government, Justice Stewart did acknowledge in a footnote that
the question of whether Mendenhall felt free to "walk away" when
39. Id. at 547, 100 S. Ct. at 1873. A drug courier profile is a compilation of
characteristics common to drug couriers developed by the Drug Enforcement Agency in
the early 1970's. Morgan Cloud, Search and Seizure by the Numbers: The Drug Courier
Profile and Judicial Review of Investigative Formulas, 65 B.U.L. Rev. 843, 844 (1985).
The detectives were suspicious of Mendenhall because (1) Los Angeles is believed to
be a place of origin for much of the heroin brought to Detroit; (2) Mendenhall was the
last person to leave the plane, appeared excessively nervous, and completely scanned the
entire area where the agents were standing; (3) Mendenhall claimed no luggage after
leaving the plane; and (4) Mendenhall changed airlines for her flight out of Detroit.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 547 n.I, 100 S. Ct. at 1873 n.l.
40. Id. at 548, 100 S. Ct. at 1874.
41. Id., 100 S. Ct. at 1874.
42. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544. 548-49, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1874 (1980).
43. Id. at 558, 100 S. Ct. at 1879. Four members of the Court sought to remand
the case for an evidentiary hearing on whether a seizure occurred. Id. at 570-71, 100 S.
Ct. at 1885-86. (White, J. dissenting). Three justices were comfortable assuming that the
stop constituted a seizure because they believed the agents had reasonable suspicion that
Mendenhall was engaged in criminal activity thereby rendering constitutional the detention
for routine questioning. Id. at 560, 100 S. Ct. at 1880.
44. Id. at 554, 100 S. Ct. at 1877.
45. Id. at 555, 100 S. Ct. at 1878.
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asked by two Government agents for her identification and ticket was
an extremely close one.46
3. Florida v. Royer
Three years later, the Court employed the Mendenhall "free to
leave" test 4 in Florida v. Royer.4 There, detectives stopped Royer at
the Miami International Airport after observing that his behavior matched
a drug courier profile. 49 The detectives requested Royer's airline ticket
and identification and asked him to accompany them to an office.
Without consent or agreement, one of the detectives, using Royer's
luggage tag, obtained the luggage from the airline. After Royer unlocked
the suitcase, the detective opened it without obtaining further assent
from Royer. This occurred after the agents informed Royer that they
were narcotics agents and suspected him of transporting drugs.3 0 The
search led to the discovery of marijuana. Royer contested its admissi-
bility, arguing the discovery resulted from an unlawful seizure occurring
when the agents restrained his freedom to leave by obtaining his tickets,
identification, and luggage." Royer asserted that the detectives lacked
probable cause to seize him at the time they took his belongings and
accompanied him to an isolated room, thereby precluding the admis-
sibility of any evidence obtained as a result of the seizure. 2 Even if he
had consented, the illegal seizure would make the consent irrelevant.
On these facts, the Court held that the detectives had seized the
suspect, thereby exceeding the limits of a Terry-type stop. 3 Consequently,
Royer's detention was a more serious intrusion on his personal liberty
than is 'allowable on a mere suspicion of criminal activity.14 Probable
cause was required, and, because the detention was without any, the
evidence obtained as a result was inadmissible.
In its reasoning, the Court found Royer different from Mendenhall
because the officers in Royer requested and retained Royer's ticket"
46. "For me, the question whether the respondent in this case reasonably could have
thought she was free to 'walk away' when asked by two Government agents for her
driver's license and ticket is extremely close." Id. at 560 n.l, 100 S. Ct. at 1880 n.l.
47. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1877 (1980).
See supra notes 37-46 and accompanying text.
48. 460 U.S. 491, 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983).
49. Id. at 493, 103 S. Ct. at 1321-22. Particularly, the detectives observed that Royer
had been carrying heavily laden luggage, appeared extremely nervous, was young, paid
cash for his ticket from a large roll of bills, and only transcribed a name and destination
on his luggage tag. Id. at 494 n.2, 103 S. Ct. at 1322 n.2.
50. Id. at 494, 103 S. Ct. at 1322.
51. Id. at 496, 103 S. Ct. at 1323.
52. Id., 103 S. Ct. at 1323.
53. Id. at 501-02, 103 S. Ct. at 1326, 1328.
54. Id. at 502, 103 S. Ct. at 1326-27.
55. Id. at 503-04 n.9, 103 S. Ct. at 1327 n.9.
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and identification before asking him to accompany them to the DEA
office. 6 Thus, Royer was effectively seized within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment because there was a show of authority such that a
reasonable person would not have believed he was free to leave."
4. I.N.S. v. Delgado
One year later, the Supreme Court again embraced the "free to
leave" test in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Delgado." s The
facts involved federal officers who conducted a "factory survey" of a
workplace for illegal aliens. The workers sought an injunction against
the survey, alleging such official action unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment. 9 The agents, acting pursuant to a warrant, approached
employees, identified themselves, and asked the employees questions
regarding their citizenship. 60 The warrants were issued on a showing of
probable cause by the INS that several illegal aliens were employed at
a certain factory although neither of the search warrants identified any
particular aliens by name.6' During the time INS agents moved syste-
matically through the factory questioning employees, other agents po-
sitioned themselves near the factory exits. All agents displayed badges,
carried walkie-talkies, and were armed, although at no point during any
of the surveys was a weapon drawn.Y
Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court concluded that no seizure
took place. 63 The questioning of the individual workers did not amount
to a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment; therefore,
probable cause was not required, and any evidence obtained would be
admissible. In its reasoning, the Court acknowledged that the workers
may not have been free to leave their worksite, but explained that this
was not the result of the agents' actions: "Ordinarily, when people are
at work their freedom to move about has been meaningfully restricted,
not by the actions of law enforcement officials, but by the worker's
voluntary obligations to their employers." 64
56. Id. at 503-04, 103 S. Ct. at 1327.
57. Id. at 502, 103 S. Ct. at 1326. The court noted that the initial stop was justified
by reasonable suspicion and that had the officer used less intrusive means to investigate
these suspicions, i.e., use of a narcotics detector canine to detect the presence of drugs.
there would have been probable cause to detain and arrest Royer. Id. at 504-06, 103 S.
Ct. at 1328 n.10.
58. 466 U.S. 210, 104 S. Ct. 1758 (1984).
59. Id. at 212-13, 104 S. Ct. at 1760-61.
60. Id., 104 S. Ct. at 1760-61.
61. Id., 104 S. Ct. at 1760-61.
62. Id., 104 S. Ct. at 1760-61.
63. Id. at 219, 104 S. Ct. at 1764.
64. Id. at 218, 104 S. Ct. at 1763.
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In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell stated that he was not as
comfortable as his fellow justices that a reasonable factory worker in
this position would have felt free to refuse the INS agents' questions
and to leave the factory."3 However, since he found this case analagous
to constitutionally upheld warrantless border searches for illegal aliens,"
there was, in his opinion, no reason to decide the "seizure" question.67
5. Michigan v. Chesternut
In 1988, the Supreme Court once again applied Mendenhall's "free
to leave" test in Michigan v. Chesternut." After observing the approach
of a police car on routine patrol, Chesternut began to run." The police
followed him in order to determine where he was going and, after
catching up with him, drove alongside of him for a short distance.
During this time, the officers observed him discarding a number of
packets later determined to contain codeine.70 After Chesternut was
charged with drug offenses, a magistrate held that he had been unlawfully
seized during the chase." This was affirmed at the appellate level under
previous state decisions rendering any police pursuit a "seizure.'" 72 As
no probable cause existed when the police undertook pursuit of Ches-
ternut, their seizure of him was unreasonable; therefore, the drugs
subsequently obtained were inadmissible and the charges were dismissed."
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed. Justice Blackmun rejected
the lower court's position that any police pursuit constituted a seizure.
Instead, he indicated that the Court would adhere to the traditional
approach that a person is seized "only if, in view of all the circumstances
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed he
was not free to leave."71 4 Under this approach, the Court held that no
seizure occurred before Chesternut discarded the packets:
65. Id. at 221, 104 S. Ct. at 1765 (Powell, J., concurring).
66. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976).
67. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 221, 104 S. Ct. at 1765.
68. 486 U.S. 567, 108 S. Ct. 1975 (1988).
69. Id. at 569, 108 S. Ct. at 1977.
70. Id., 108 S. Ct. at 1977. The police also found other illegal drugs and paraphernalia
on Chesternut's person.
71. Id. at 570, 108 S. Ct. at 1977.78. The magistrate ruled that the "chase" implicated
Fourth Amendment protections and was not justified merely because Chesternut ran at
the sight of police.
72. Id., 108 S. Ct. at 1977-78. The Michigan Court of Appeals rested its holding
on People v. Terrell, 77 Mich. App. 676, 259 N.W.2d 1987 (1977) and People v. Shabaz,
424 Mich. 42, 378 N.W.2d 451 (1985). Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 571 n.3, 108 S. Ct. at
1970 n.3.
73. Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 571, 108 S. Ct. at 1978.
74. Id. at 573, 108 S. Ct. at 1979 (quoting from U.S. v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544.
100 S. Ct. 1870 (1980)).
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[T]he police conduct involved here would not have communicated
to the reasonable person an attempt to capture or otherwise
intrude upon [the person's] freedom of movement. The record
does not reflect that the police activated a siren or flashers; or
that they commanded [Chesternut] to halt, or displayed any
weapons; or that they operated the car in an aggressive manner
to block [Chesternut's] course or otherwise control the direction
or speed of his movement. While the very presence of a police
car driving parallel to a running pedestrian could be somewhat
intimidating, this kind of police presence does not, standing
alone, constitute a seizure."
Consequently, the requirement of probable cause was held unnecessary
because the fact that the police were driving alongside of Chesternut
was not so intimidating as to cause him to reasonably believe he was
not free to ignore the police presence and go about his business . 6
Accordingly, the discarded packets were properly obtained, and the Court
ruled that the charges against the defendant were improperly dismissed."
C. Summary of Jurisprudence Prior to Bostick
Over the past two decades, Terry, Mendenhall, Royer, Delgado, and
Chesternut, served to provide a test for guiding federal and state courts
in rendering decisions on whether an individual has been seized, thereby
invoking the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment. These
cases, construed together, lead to the- conclusion that a seizure occurs
when, in light of all surrounding circumstances, a reasonable person
would have believed he was not free to leave the presence of the
authorities or otherwise terminate the encounter.
This "free to leave" test seems a -practical and sensible standard
when one considers its objectives. The Fourth Amendment protects a
person's freedom from unlawful governmental intrusions, and the scope
of this protection extends to a person's freedom from unwarranted
seizures. This is clearly a protection that every American appreciates.
In ordering their daily affairs, Americans need not account for the
possibility that they may be seized or detained at a moment's notice,
unless there is probable cause for officials to believe that they are engaged
in or involved with unlawful conduct. Thus, one who is seized without
probable cause is protected, since any evidence obtained from the seizure
or detention is inadmissible in court. To determine if this Fourth Amend-
ment protection is triggered, the courts must be able to point to particular
facts and circumstances to determine if a person has been seized.
75. Id. at 575, 108 S. Ct. at 1980.
76. Id. at 576, 108 S. Ct. at 1981.
77. Id., 108 S. Ct. at 1981.
1192 [Vol. 52
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One possible standard is that a person is seized only when the police
have accomplished a literal physical apprehension of the individual.
Admittedly, this standard is simple and precise. It is also inflexible.
This characteristic most likely influenced the Supreme Court's creation
of the flexible "free to leave" standard. In Chesternut, the Court stated,
The test is necessarily imprecise, because it is designed to assess
the coercive effect of police conduct, taken as a whole, rather
than to focus on particular details of that conduct in isolation."8
In order to* measure the extent of police coercion, it makes good sense
that the mental state of the suspect be considered. If a person reasonably
believes himself seized or detained, he will likely respond to police in
a submissive fashion regardless of whether actual detention has occurred.
This results in a greater liklihood that police will extract information
or possessions which reveal criminal conduct. This in turn encourages
police to use such situations to their advantage.
For example, if an inflexible standard of actual physical apprehension
were employed to determine whether a seizure occured, police would
feel encouraged to create intimidating surroundings for those they wish
to question, probe or otherwise accost. To avoid constitutional problems,
officials would need only to refrain from physically detaining the suspect.
Any evidence obtained from the suspect would be admissible. Alter-
natively, if the surroundings and circumstances created by the police
were so intimidating that the individual reasonably believed he had been
detained, police would be required to have probable cause or reasonable
suspicion for their conduct, since the absence of such justification renders
inadmissible any fruits from their efforts.
That is precisely what the "free to leave" test accomplishes. After
considering all surrounding circumstances, the court determines whether
an average reasonable person would believe he would be seized or
detained upon his attempt to leave. The test's objective standard allows
the police to predetermine whether the conduct comtemplated gives rise
to Fourth Amendment considerations. This "reasonable person" stan-
dard also ensures that the scope of the Fourth Amendment protection
does not vary with the state of mind of the particular person being
approached."9
In 1989, the Florida Supreme Court took the opportunity to apply
the foregoing line of jurisprudence, its thematical "free to leave" test,
and its underlying rationale in determining whether a seizure occurred
in Bostick v. State.
78. Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573, 108 S. Ct. 1975, 1979 (1988).
79. Id. at 574 , 108 S. Ct. at 1980.
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IV. BosTIcK V. STATE80
Under the facts of Bostick,"' and in light of prior Supreme Court
jurisprudence, the Florida Supreme Court decided that Bostick was
"seized" by the officers without "reasonable suspicion" or probable
cause, and that any consent he gave thereafter to search his luggage
was tainted by the illegal detention.82 The court found that the sheriff's
department's standard procedure of "working the buses" was an in-
vestigative practice implicating Fourth Amendment protections against
unreasonable seizures of the person. 3 The court, attempting to apply
the standard which was spelled out in Mendenhall and its progeny,
considered the crucial question to be whether, under all the circum-
stances, a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to
leave. 4
Applying this standard to the facts, the court articulated that under
the circumstances, a reasonable traveler would not have felt that he was
"free to leave" or that he was "free to disregard the questions and
walk away."8" Further, the court found, there was no place to which
a reasonable bus traveler during a momentary layover might leave and
no place to which he might walk away. The fact that the officers
partially blocked the aisle, and that one appeared to carry a gun only
underscored this conclusion. 6
Having determined that Bostick was detained or seized within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, the Florida court addressed the
propriety of such a detention. It noted that broad principles of federal
law, as well as the specific requirements of Florida law, require that
the police at a minimum have had a reasonable articulable suspicion
before detaining Bostick.' After considering the State's concession that
it lacked any basis for suspicion, the court held that Bostick's detention
was unlawful and unjustified.
This left only the issue of whether the defendant's consent purged
the taint of the illegal police conduct. The Florida court adhered to
language used in an earlier state supreme court decision:
80. 554 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 1989).
81. Police officers, without probable cause, approached a bus passenger during a
momentary layover and requested him to produce identification and indicate his destination.
This resulted in the discovery of illegal drugs and the passenger's arrest. See supra text
at section II for a detailed discussion of the facts of Bosfick.
82. 554 So. 2d at 1157, 1158.
83. Id. at 1156.
84. Bostick v. State, 554 So. 2d 1153, 1157 (Fla. 1989).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1157.58. In this context, the Florida requirement of reasonable suspicion
is tantamount to the probable cause requirement as defined at supra note 23.
88. Id. at 1158.
1194 [Vol. 52
[Wlhen consent is obtained after illegal police activity such as
an illegal search or arrest, the unlawful police action presump-
tively taints and renders involuntary any consent to search. The
consent will be held voluntary only if there is clear and con-
vincing proof of an unequivocal break in the chain of illegality
sufficient to dissipate the taint of prior illegal action.19
Consequently, the court found that the entire situation was intimidating,
and that such an environment could not have broken the chain of
illegality to validate the consent. The government had therefore interfered
with the privacy of an individual citizen who was not even suspected
of any criminal wrongdoing 0
This holding, as the Florida Supreme Court intended, is apparently
consistent with prior United States Supreme Court and Florida juris-
prudence.91 That is, the court examined the totality of the. circumstances
with which Bostick was presented and questioned whether he reasonably
believed he could refuse the questions and terminate the encounter. Their
answer was no. The United States Supreme Court, in an opinion by
Justice O'Connor disagreed with the Florida court's interpretation of
the "free to leave" test and, consequently, with the lower court's answer
to that test.
V. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT HOLDING
In Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court, the issue is initially
stated as whether the encounter on the bus necessarily constituted a
"seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 2 The Court
accepted the concession that no reasonable suspicion existed for the
officers to "seize" Bostick, and that, if a seizure took place, the drugs
found must be suppressed.93 However, the ultimate holding of the case
does not address whether Bostick was seized at all.94
In a 6-3 decision, the United States Supreme Court held that the
Florida Supreme Court had wrongfully adopted a per se rule that every
encounter on a bus constitutes a seizure, thereby failing to evaluate the
89. Id. at 1158, quoting Norman v. State, 379 So. 2d 643, 646-47 (Fla. 1980).
90. Bostick v. State, 554 So. 2d 1153, 1158 (Fla. 1989).
91. Alvarez v. State, 515 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that
the same practices on Amtrak trains by the Sheriff's Department was the functional
equivalent of a detention).
92. Florida v. Bostick, IIl S. Ct. 2382, 2386 (1991). The Court, in defining the
issue, stated:
The sole issue presented for our review is whether a police encounter on a bus
of the type described above necessarily constitutes a "seizure" within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment.
93. Id. at 2386.
94. Id. at 2388.
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seizure question under the correct legal standard.95 Consequently, the
Court remanded the seizure issue to the lower court but not without
guidance as to the "proper" standard to be employed."
In articulating its holding that the Florida Supreme Court had wrong-
fully decided that the police conduct was unconstitutional per se, the
Supreme Court reasoned that the Florida court's decision was predicated
on a single fact-that the encounter had occurred on a bus-rather than
on the totality of circumstances. 7 Although it was acknowledged that
the Florida court used the "free to leave" standard spelled out in
Mendenhall, the Court found this focus misplaced. Instead, Justice
O'Connor's opinion emphasized the "principle that those words were
intended to capture."98 Consequently, the Court said the proper test,
when deciding whether an officer's request to search a bus passenger's
luggage was so coercive as to constitute a seizure, is not whether a
reasonable person would feel free to leave, but "whether [he) would
feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the
encounter."" Applying this standard to the case, the Court stated:
ITIhe mere fact that Bostick did not feel free to leave the bus
does not mean that the police seized him. Bostick was a passenger
on a bus that was scheduled to depart. He would not have felt
free to leave the bus even if the police had not been present.
Bostick's movements were "confined" in a sense, but this was
the natural result of his decision to take the bus; it says nothing
about whether or not the police conduct at issue was coercive.1 °°
The Supreme Court anchors its decision on Bostick's analytically
indistinguishable likeness to Delgado in that Bostick's freedom of move-
ment was restricted by a factor independent of police conduct, i.e., his
being a passenger on a bus.10 1 Remember that in the Delgado decision
a factory worker's obligation to his employer served as the source of
restriction of freedom rather than the presence of armed INS agents at
the exits. Since the Court found the "free to leave" analysis was basically
inapplicable in its Delgado decision, it accordingly held the analysis
inapplicable to Bostick. °'0 Focusing instead on whether the police con-
veyed to Bostick the message that compliance with their requests was
95. Id. at 2385-88.
96. Id. at 2385-89.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 2387.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See supra note 81.
102. III S. Ct. at 2387.
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required, the Court examined whether Bostick's cooperation was truly
voluntary."'
In addressing this issue the Court first dealt with Justice Marshall's
dissenting opinion which characterized the holding as permitting police
to board buses and demand voluntary cooperation through an intimi-
dating show of authority.' °0 Denying this characterization, Justice O'Con-
nor acknowledged that consent which is the product of official intimidation
or harassment is not consent at all.'10 She further stated that Bostick's
decision to cooperate would authorize a warrantless search only if made
voluntarily. Without resolving this voluntariness issue, the Court ap-
parently found significant the fact the police never pointed the guns at
Bostick nor did they otherwise threaten him.106
VI. ANALYSIS
A. The Supreme Court Holding
In deciding Florida v. Bostick, the Suprenie Court could not ignore
its prior decisions on when a "seizure" occurs within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the "free to leave" standard articulated
in Mendenhall had to be addressed. In doing so, the Court used the
facts in Bostick to justify an unadmitted departure from its traditional
standard.
In an apparent attempt to distinguish Mendenhall, Royer, and Ches-
ternut on its facts, Justice O'Connor stated:
[W]hen police attempt to question a person who is walking down
the street or through an airport lobby, it makes sense to inquire
whether a reasonable person would feel free to continue walking.
But when the person is seated on a bus and has no desire to
leave, the degree to which a reasonable person would feel free
that he or she could leave is not an accurate measure of the
coercive effect of the encounter.'07
Bostick's approach seems inconsistent with the rationale behind Men-
denhall, Royer, and Chesternut since that line of cases supports the
approach that all circumstances in each case must be considered when
determining whether police conduct amounted to a seizure. It seems
logical that the very location where the activity occurs would carry
weight as to any coercive effect of the encounter. It is not difficult to
103. Id. at 2388.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 2387.
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imagine that a reasonable person aboard an airplane at 30,000 feet
would lack a desire to leave the plane even absent an encounter such
as Bostick's. But one could hardly say that this fact would not factor
into a decision of whether coercion was present if the officials had
boarded a plane and after take-off engaged in similar conduct. Indeed,
it would seem that such an encounter would be much more intimidating
to a person in this setting for he would be stationed temporarily at a
point short of his destination and would have no means at all to evade
the officials' questioning. 0 8 Yet the Court in Bostick appears to urge
that riding a bus should not be a factor weighted heavily, if at all, in
its determination, since the suspect chose the bus as his source of
transportation. 1 9 The Court further finds that a person, once having
chosen to ride a bus, would not feel free to depart it even absent police
involvement." 0
Another reason that the Bostick opinion is questionable is the Court's
reliance on Delgado. As previously mentioned, the Supreme Court sup-
ported its Bostick decision with an analogy to Delgado. Had the Court
wished to loosen reigns on the Fourth Amendment protections, it might
have taken the opportunity to review the Delgado rationale more closely,
for it is questionable. Although it is virtually true that employees do
not "come and go" as they please during work hours, it seems a stretch
to assert that an employee, absent armed guards at exits, would not
have felt free to leave the workplace. Certainly if an employee wished
to immediately terminate his employment, he might do so and leave.
Most employees feel free to do so but choose otherwise. However, armed
agents at the door could influence a person to postpone his exercise of
this choice.
This same rationale can be applied to Bostick's situation on the
bus. Typically, bus passengers do not depart a bus during a temporary
108. This can also be illustrated with situations less extreme than a person being above
ground. For example, a person on a cruise ship in the Atlantic Ocean, encountered with
a suspicionless police search such as that in Bostick, may reasonably feel coerced into
cooperation with the officials. Such confines would not leave a reasonable person to
believe he could avoid or terminate the encounter by leaving the presence of the police.
There would simply be no place to go but the ocean.
Similarly, trains typically make several intermediate stops while en route. Should
police choose these stopping points to conduct intimidating suspicionless "sweeps", pas-
sengers are forced to choose between submission and exiting the train to terminate the
encounter. It is easy to imagine that many passengers would want to avoid being stranded
at a train station in an unfamiliar location.
109. Florida v. Bostick, Ill S. Ct. 2382, 2387 (1991). In all fairness, Justice O'Connor
never expressly states that the location of a police encounter is irrelevant. The Court
expressed that it is but one factor to consider. However, the Court seems to allocate only
nominal weight to this factor when the suspect has chosen to travel by bus.
110. Id.
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layover at a location short of the intended destination. However, should
a passenger, for whatever reason, choose to do so, he certainly would
feel free to act accordingly. Psychologically, there are no external factors
interfering with the decision to exit or to remain on the bus aside from
whether the intermediate location is convenient for the passenger. This
is likely to change with the presence of armed officials surrounding the
passenger during a period of inquisition. The passengers' decision to
leave or terminate the encounter is now influenced by the officers' show
of authority and any freedom to leave he may have felt is more likely
to be impaired.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court is not likely to overrule a' rationale
employed only seven years ago. However, the Supreme Court could
have distinguished Delgado rather easily without addressing the rationale
behind it. Specifically, the agents in Delgado were acting pursuant to
a warrant of which issuance was based on probable cause."' In Bostick,
the officers admitted that they had no articulable suspicion much less
a warrant. It seems that this fact would have provided the court with
a "hook to hang its hat on." Interestingly though, Justice O'Connor
makes no mention of this difference in her assertion that Bostick is
analytically indistinguishable from Delgado.
Another questionable aspect of the Bostick decision is the Court's
unyielding determination that the Florida Supreme Court adopted a per
se rule that a suspicionless search is unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment." 2 Such a determination implies that the Florida court ne-
glected to properly apply the Mendenhall test, for its application requires
an examination of all surrounding facts and circumstances to determine
if an individual would have reasonably believed he was free to leave."'
Justice O'Connor expressly states in her opinion that the Florida Supreme
Court rested its decision on a single fact-that the encounter took place
on a bus-rather than on the totality of the circumstances." 4 However,
the Court's majority opinion itself states several facts which the Court
acknowledges to be salient to the lower court's opinion. Particularly,
the Florida court considered that two officers complete with badges and
insignia boarded a bus; there was one officer carrying a pistol; there
was no articulable suspicion when the officers picked out Bostick; the
officers persisted in questioning after the initial requests revealed nothing
remarkable; and they requested Bostick's consent to search his luggage.",
From this set of facts, it seems difficult to credibly assert that the
lower court rested its entire decision only on the fact that a bus was
111. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
114. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2388.
115. Id. at 2384-85.
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involved. It appears more accurate that the bus was only one of the
lower court's considerations in determining whether Bostick indeed felt
"free to leave." However, the Florida court did place great weight on
this factor because Bostick had only the confines of a bus (soon to
depart) to move about had he felt the officers would let him do S0.116
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's ultimate holding in Florida v. Bostick
is that random consensual searches such as those practiced by Broward
County's Sheriff's Department are not per se unconstitutional.", One
can almost hear the Florida Supreme Court Justices asking themselves,
"Who ever said they were?"
B. Potential Repurcussions
Although the Supreme Court rendered no decision as to whether
the police conduct in Bostick constituted a seizure, it did substantially
alter a long-employed standard. It seems now that the appropriate inquiry
is whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers'
requests or otherwise terminate the encounter." 8 Additionally, the lo-
cation of the encounter, although a consideration, will evidently be
weighed heavily in considering the totality of the circumstances when
the individual has chosen to place himself in a location that is naturally
restrictive.
Standing alone, the Bostick decision is interesting in that it illustrates
a conservative Supreme Court's willingness to alter traditional standards
as to what events trigger Fourth Amendment protections. Indeed, this
willingness had already been displayed one month earlier than the Bostick
decision in another Supreme Court decision which, like Bostick, altered
the standard for determining when a seizure occurs.
In California v. Hodari D.,119 a group of youths ran away at the
approach of a police car. The prosecution conceded that the officers
had no probable cause to believe the youths were committing or had
committed a crime. However, the police began chasing the youths. After
noticing the defendant, Hodari, toss down a small rock, later determined
to be crack cocaine, one of the officers proceeded to tackle him and
restrain him. 20 The California Court of Appeal held that the crack
cocaine must be suppressed because Hodari was effectively seized without
116. Bostick v. State, 554 So. 2d 1153, 1157 (Fla. 1989).
117. Florida v. Bostick, III S. Ct. 2382, 2389 (991).
118. Id. at 2387.
119. 111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991). For an in-depth discussion and analysis of this decision
see Randolph Alexander Piedrahita, Note, A Conservative Court Says "Goodbye to All
That" and Forges a New Order in the Law of Seizure-California v. Hodari D., 52 La.
L. Rev. _(1992).
120. 111 S. Ct. at 1549.
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probable cause when he realized the police were chasing him.'' Again,
this determination of seizure was consistent with the traditional "free
to leave" standard and seemed inconspicuous. The United States Supreme
Court, however, reversed.
Justice Scalia, in the majority opinion, held that the defendant was
not seized until the police physically grabbed him:
The narrow question before us is'whether, with respect to a
show of authority as with respect to application of physical
force, a seizure occurs even though the subject does not yield.
We hold that it does not .... In sum, assuming that [the police]
pursuit in the present case constituted a "show of authority"
enjoining Hodari to halt, since Hodari did not comply with that
injunction he was not seized until he was tackled.'2
This holding seems to abandon the "free to leave" standard of Men-
denhall and to adopt a standard of whether physical force was applied
as to result in a submission to authority. Only then will a seizure occur
and Fourth Amendment protections apply. Consequently, since the drugs
were discovered prior to Hodari being tackled and seized, their use as
evidence was admissible notwithstanding the absence of probable cause
before the chase ensued.
The new standards adopted in Bostick and Hodari D. invite police
forces to utilize investigative techniques previously thought to have been
constitutionally suspect. Indeed, even citizens without legal education
have historically understood (and perhaps taken for granted) that police
officers are not free to accost, question, and search them without a
justifiable reason to do so. However, the holdings in Bostick and Hodari
D. appear to indicate to law enforcement agents throughout this country
that such tactics are now permissible.
For example, police officers seeking to randomly search citizens with
hopes of discovering drugs or other illegal contraband might interpret
the Court's recent decision as an invitation to seek out citizens in
naturally confining locations and, while being careful not to physically
apprehend them, coerce their consent through intimidating methods of
inquisition. Because the "suspect" has chosen to be present in such a
location which signicantly confines his freedom to leave, any police
exploitation of this decision will not result in a "seizure" within the
scope of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, probable cause is not required
of the police, and any evidence obtained from the encounter will be
admissible.
Taken to its logical extension, the new standard as applied by the
Supreme Court would seemingly permit armed police officers, lacking
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1550, 1552.
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probable cause, to enter an office building, block off the exits and begin
employing intimidating measures to extract from office employees in-
formation or possessions revealing criminal conduct. Under Bostick and
Hodari D., absent any physical apprehension of the employees, a court
could find that the employees were not "seized." The rationale for such
a decision could read as follows:
Although under the traditional standard of Mendenhall, the
employees may not have felt free to leave, this confinement was
not a result of police conduct. Rather, the confinement was
inherent in the employees presence at their workplace. Even
absent any police actions taken, the employees would not have
felt free to leave work and go about their business. Consequently,
"the employees were not seized for purposes of the Fourth Amend-
ment thereby making the requirement of probable cause unnec-
essary, and rendering any discovered evidence admissible.
Although such a ruling may seem harsh on its face, it would not be
inconsistent with a literal reading of the recent Supreme Court decisions
governing Fourth Amendment seizures.
Another consideration of the Bostick decision is its potential effect
on one of many American's favorite pasttimes-travel. It is not incon-
ceivable that, under Bostick, Americans could very well find themselves
in a position where encounters with police officers, who desire to subject
them to random searches and seizures, will be an expense of traveling
in this country. When one considers the number of people who incor-
porate travel across this country into their recreational and work activ-
ities, the effects of this police freedom could be felt by all.
Perhaps the most interesting effects of Bostick and Hodari D. would
arise out of a future Supreme Court decision that flight from police,
with nothing more, is sufficient to justify a seizure and search. One
legal commentator, exploring this possibility, states:
The only way to avoid an interrogation and search may be to
stand up to an armed police officer and declare, "I will not
leave your presence, but I will not consent to be questioned,
seized or searched." One wonders how many people would have
the courage to take such a stand. One also wonders just how
suspicious Justice Scalia would consider such behavior. 23
VII. CONCLUSION
The United States Constitution was constructed as a safeguard against
intrusions on individual rights. Specifically, the Fourth Amendment pro-
tects us all from arbitrary intrusions by our government.
123. Ira Mickenberg, Criminal Rulings Granted the States Broad New Power, Nat'l
L.J., August 19, 1991, at Sit, S14.
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It is perhaps unfortunate that judicial decisions resolving Fourth
Amendment issues are rendered in the context of criminal prosecutions,
many of which involve drug trafficking.2 4 In such cases, it is difficult
to sympathize with a defendant who is transporting drugs into or across
the country. Instead, the courts find it easier to forge exceptions to
general rules which serve to protect citizens where a significant number
of drug offenders employ those very rules as a mechanism to evade
prosecution or conviction. These court-created exceptions make it easier
for law enforcement officials to successfully combat the drug problem.
However, judicial decisions which seemingly erode Fourth Amendment
protections in order to facilitate effective drug enforcement simultane-
ously invite police to abuse their power to search and seize. Specifically,
it encourages avoidance of the often time consuming warrant process
in favor of warrantless searches and seizures.
No one denies that the drug problem is a concern to the American
government and its citizens. Drug trafficking needs to be stopped. But
at what price? And by what means? Perhaps the Florida Supreme Court
was attempting to ask these very questions when it stated:
Without doubt the inherently transient nature of drug courier
activity presents difficult law enforcement problems. Roving pa-
trols, random sweeps, and arbitrary searches or seizures would
go far to eliminate such crime in this state. Nazi Germany,
Soviet Russia, and Communist Cuba have demonstrated all too
tellingly the effectiveness of such methods. Yet we are not a
state that subscribes to the notion that ends justify means.
History demonstrates that the adoption of repressive measures,
even to eliminate a clear evil, usually results only in repression
more mindless and terrifying than the evil that prompted them.
Means have a disturbing tendency to become the end result. 12
Maybe the fastest means to ensure victory in the country's "war
on drugs" is to sacrifice fundamental protections traditionally afforded
to all of us. And perhaps many citizens are willing to subject themselves
to excessive forces of government to further this end. However, an
ultimate victory in the short run at such great an expense might one
day, in retrospect, seem extremely hollow. As another Florida judge has
already noted:
Occasionally the price we must pay to make innocent persons
secure from unreasonable search and seizure of their persons or
property is to let an offender go. Those who suffered harassment
124. Eulis Simien, Jr., The Interrelationship of the Scope of the Fourth Amendment
and Standing to Object to Unreasonable Searches, 41 Ark. L. Rev. 487, 488 (1988).
125. Bostick v. State, 554 So. 2d 1153, 1158-59 (Fla. 1989).
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from King George III's forces would say that is not a great
price to pay, So would residents of the numerous totalitarian
and authoritarian states of our day."2 6
The idea of people departing from the United States to escape govern-
mental harrassment in search of greater individual liberties might make
for an interesting novel. But, it would make an even more interesting
chapter of a future American history book.
Mark William Fry
126. Snider v. State, 501 So. 2d 609, 610 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (Glickstein,
J., dissenting).
